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Abstract
This paper evaluates the advisability of a monetary union in Latin
America applying the theory of optimum currency areas (OCA). The
analysis, based on the traditional OCA criteria, suggests that there is
no evidence for any monetary integration in Latin America, even at
a sub-regional level. Latin American countries have evidenced a low
degree of trade integration and asymmetric co-movements among their
shocks. Moreover, important differences in the speed of adjustment
and size of shocks are found. Higher policy coordination seems to be
necessary before starting any economic integration process in Latin
America.
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1 Introduction
In recent years international economy has shifted from a bipolar struc-
ture (under the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union) to a multipolar world
with the United States, the EU and Japan as main powers.
In this new environment other countries are trying to establish
new regional economic blocs. In this sense can be view the two agree-
ments involving Latin America countries called MERCOSUR and the
Andean Community1.
This tendency towards an economic clustering has renewed the
interest for the theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA). It seems
that the OCA criteria can be a good instrument to evaluate the costs
and benefits for countries that are willing to form a currency union.
As evidenced by the EU and the EURO, the processes of mone-
tary unification are, in general, extremely difficult. The Latin America
case seems to be complicated by the different policies adopted by dif-
ferent countries and by the tumultuous economic history of the region.
Nevertheless, the extremely high inflation rates experienced by Latin-
American countries have increased the pertinence of the proposal of a
unique currency for this area.
Trying to assess the road to follow for the economic integration
in Latin America is beyond the aim of this paper. Rather, the paper
intends to measure to what extent the actual level of economic integra-
tion in Latin America (or at least in one Southern America sub-region)
fits the classical OCA criteria in order to establish a currency union
2.
The main task is to evaluate the likelihood of asymmetric shocks
for the considered countries. If the shocks between two countries are
positively correlated, the optimal policy choice of one country will be
appropriate for the other as well. In this case, the cost of a currency
union will be low. In addition, an analysis of trade openness and in-
tegration of Latin American countries is reported in order to further
evaluate the level of economic integration in the area. Moreover the
levels of trade openness and intra-regional integration have been nec-
essary to explain and interpret some results of the structural shocks
analysis.
1MERCOSUR was created by an agreement signed between Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay in 1991, while the Andean Community involves Bolivia, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.
2The paper explores the ex-ante conditions for the constitution of an OCA. Although
there is a part of the theory focusing on the ex-post conditions, the choice was to leave
it apart, because it seemed that the arguments based on the ex-ante approach are more
convincing.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a selective
survey of the literature on optimum currency areas and its application
to the Latin American case. Section 3 describes the processes of trade
openness and trade integration in the region. Section 4 evaluates
the asymmetry and other characteristics of shocks in Latin America,
implementing a Structural Vector Autoregression model (SVAR) a` la
Blanchard and Quah (1989). Section 5 concludes the study.
2 Optimal Currency Areas: Theory and
Evidence from Latin America
The starting point for every literature on the OCA theory is Mundell
(1961). The author defines a currency area as a ” ...domain within
which exchange rates are fixed...” 3. According to Mundell two coun-
tries are interested in establishing a monetary union if there is a high
degree of factor mobility (capital and labor) between them. The au-
thor argues that this is necessary to adjust to eventual asymmetric
shocks. In Mundell’s framework the costs of a currency union will
be lower the higher the symmetry of shocks between the countries
interested by the analysis. If the shocks between two countries are
positively correlated, the policy choices of one country will be appro-
priate for the other as well. Thus, if the same disturbance has the
same effects in two areas, there is an efficiency argument for forming
a currency area between these two regions4.
McKinnon (1963) adds the size and the degree of openness as other
criteria for a choice of the exchange rate regime. The country’s size
is supposed to be negatively correlated to its openness, and it can
be argued that the more a country is open to trade, the higher is
its interest of adopting a fixed exchange rate regime. Trade openness
and trade interdependence, among countries willing to form a currency
union, can be identified as relevant indicators for any kind of analysis
on a possible OCA. Moreover, for a given group of countries, the higher
the financial integration the less it needs exchange rate variations.
It happens because small interest rate variations will determine the
necessary flows of capital for the balance of payment equilibrium.
Kenen P. (1969) triggers the tradition of a literature focusing on
the determinant elements of the incidence of shocks. The author states
that the degree of product or industry diversification is a crucial ele-
ment for assessing the costs and benefits of a currency union. On the
other side Ingram (1973) explores the relevance of capital mobility,
3Mundell R. (1961) pp.657.
4For a clear explanation of these mechanism see De Grauwe P. (2001).
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concluding that capital mobility can reallocate the resources across
regions substituting any eventual lack of labor mobility.
The traditional theory focuses exclusively on the costs, ignoring
the benefits analysis. Ishiyama (1975) suggests a more complete ap-
proach, in order to consider the single criteria in a multidimensional
way. The hypothesis that a country will decide to shift from a regime
to another, only because this shift will not be costly, seems to be not
completely convincing. It seems more reasonable that such a shift can
be determined because it gives some benefits.
In order to analyze costs and benefits, Krugman and Obstfeld
(1999) and De Grauwe (2001) define a cost curve and a benefit curve,
with both curves as functions of the degree of economic integration.
Because of its Keynesian origin, the OCA theory has focused on
the demand side ignoring the supply one. In this sense the contribute
of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) is extremely important. The au-
thors test, for Europe using the U.S.A. as a benchmark, not only the
presence of asymmetric demand shocks but also the probability of
supply shocks. In both cases, a high probability of asymmetric shocks
suggests to avoid a monetary union.
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) extend this analysis to other ar-
eas and conclude that there is no evidence for any common currency in
Latin America using yearly data for the period 1969-89. Arora (1999)
extends the sample period to 1998, including also the period after the
creation of Mercosur, but reaches the same conclusion.
Other econometric studies focusing on Latin America have evi-
denced little or negative correlations of shocks. Licandro Ferrando
(1998) states that the shocks in Mercosur are less symmetric than in
Europe, but evidences that the shock correlation between Argentina
and Brazil has increased over time. In the same direction are the re-
sults for Mercosur in Carrera et al. (1998), that detect an increase in
correlation for the productive cycles. However both papers do not cap-
ture the Argentinean and Brazilian crisis, thus it can be argued that
extremely lower or negative correlations could be found expanding the
sample. Silva et al. (2003) state that the underlying asymmetries be-
tween Argentina and Brazil were exacerbated when Brazil switched to
floating in 1999, increasing the divergence in the patterns of output
fluctuations. Moreover, even external shocks had adverse effects in
terms of synchronization in the Mercosur area. In Kronberger (2002)
one of the most interesting conclusions is that from 1980 to 1995 Mer-
cosur countries were touched by many shocks that had an endogenous
nature. Then, in the second part of the 90s the Mercosur economies
suffered in major part exogenous shocks. The author also states that
the low degree of trade openness and integration, and the low level of
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labor mobility will not compensate for the asymmetric shocks in the
case of a currency union.
As preliminarily evidenced by Kronberger (2002), besides the prob-
ability and the magnitude of asymmetric shocks, many studies try to
apply the OCA theory to Latin America testing also other criteria. In
this direction move Yeiaty and Sturzenegger (2000), testing for OCA
theory in Mercosur countries. For the classical OCA view they con-
clude that up to 1997 the Mercosur has not determined a reorientation
of the trade but has only accompanied the openness that its countries
experienced during that period. Moreover, they expect divergent un-
employment rates if a common currency is established (because of
labor market rigidity and low factor mobility), and no benefits from
the financial openness analysis. The authors suggest that an addi-
tional indicator for the profitability of a currency union could be the
increase in credibility. Concerning to credibility, they argue that the
U.S.A. can be a good candidate for a monetary union, like Germany for
Europe, but they point out many differences between the two cases.
Germany was smaller than all the other partners together and this
is not true for U.S.A. and the Mercosur, moreover Germany traded
almost exclusively with its partners while this is not true for Latin
American countries and the United States. Thus, it does not seem re-
alistic that the U.S. would like to condition their monetary policy just
to reduce the exchange rate uncertainty with Latin America partners.
Harroyo (2002) states that the only country that can give credi-
bility are the U.S., but the countries experiencing asymmetric shocks
with the U.S.A. and that do not trade so much with them, can suffer
extremely high costs for gaining credibility. The author focuses also
on the level of de facto dollarization, suggesting that the countries
that do not trade so much with the U.S.A. (and are highly dollarized)
should still de-dollarize and float their currencies even if he states
that this could be a very complex and difficult process. Larrain et al.
(2003) make a comparison between dollarization and regional currency
union for three areas, including also Latin American countries. They
confirm the low levels of integration showed by South America coun-
tries, and add another indicator that is the substantial heterogeneity
of the effects of different factors on real exchange rate volatility, sug-
gesting that previous studies have ignored an important dimension of
countries experience.
Although from this literature overview emerges that it seems un-
reasonable to think about a currency union for all Latin American
countries, as stated in De Grauwe (2005) ”...the literature on this
question is still in its infancy...”, and the continue changes and events
occurring in this area seem to give every time new opportunities for
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further analysis.
3 Degree of Trade Openness and Inte-
gration
As first noted by McKinnon (1963), trade openness can reduce the
costs of loosing the exchange rate as an adjustment instrument. The
cost of living is highly influenced by tradable goods in open economies,
so the stabilization of the exchange rate could grant a higher degree
of price stability. Alesina and Barro (2002) find that the adoption
of a common currency can reduce some trading costs between two
countries. They conclude that, under some reasonable assumptions
about elasticities of substitution between goods, countries that trade
more with each other will benefit more from fixing their exchange rate.
3.1 Trade Openness
Table 1 displays 2004 data on trade openness for the countries ana-
lyzed, showing also sub-regional averages. Andean Community coun-
tries show a high average level of openness (25.1%), although Peru
is rather closed. These countries score better than NAFTA on this
OCA criterion, being not so far away from EU countries (which are
normally considered to be examples of open economies) openness in
the 1988.
Moreover, Canada and Mexico present a high degree of openness
but the performance of Nafta (23.3%) is influenced by the USA that
are, as expected , a closed-to-trade economy. Data on Mercosur show
an overall intermediate degree (23.3%), this is slightly surprising since
these countries have always showed low levels of trade openness. Brazil
seems to be the only country that has not increased its openness,
while Argentina and Uruguay increased their level in the last 4 years.
Paraguay remains one of the most open economies in Latin America,
but the increase in Argentina and Uruguay openness is what permits
Mercosur to perform better than in the previous years in this OCA
criterion. Chile is the country that is closer to EU level, and it is
above the other countries degree of openness.
In sum, no area scores very well in this OCA criterion, being almost
far away from the average openness that EU countries showed in 1988.
However, this score has been increased in the last years restricting the
gap with the EU area.
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Table 1: TRADE OPENNESS, 2004 (1)
Ratio Degree of Openness
Mercosur (2) 23.3 Intermediate
Argentina 21.7 Intermediate
Brazil 15.7 Low
Paraguay 26.7 High
Uruguay 28.8 High
Andean Community (2) 25.1 High
Bolivia 28.5 High
Colombia 21.8 Intermediate
Ecuador 27.6 High
Peru 19.6 Low
Venezuela 28.3 High
NAFTA(2) 23.3 Intermediate
Canada 29.1 High
Mexico 28.55 High
United States 12 Low
Memorandum Items :
Chile 30.9 Very High
Euro-area countries (2) 35.4 Very High
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2004; IFS, 2006.
(1)[(Exports + Imports)/(GDP ∗ 2)] ∗ 100.
(2) Simple averages of the trade shares euro-area countries showed in 1998. Includes Greece.
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3.2 Trade Interdependence
Although the overall trade openness is a useful tool, what really mat-
ters in order to infer whether a region could be an OCA is the intra-
regional degree of trade openness. A monetary union is more useful
for countries that have a high degree of trade interdependence, in this
case it will make sense for them to stabilize their exchange rate.
Table 2 shows intra-regional trade, as a percentage of total trade,
for the countries and regions under analysis plus NAFTA. The results
evidence that Latin American countries have a degree of openness that
is much lower than what showed by NAFTA and by the European
countries before the EMU.
Mercosur performance is extremely influenced by Brazil that scores
only 8.7%, on the other side Paraguay has an intense trade relationship
with Mercosur countries (49.8%), and also Uruguay presents a good
openness level (34.4%). An important benchmark for this analysis is
the share of trade with the United States. It has to be noted that the
average share of intra-community trade of Mercosur countries (29%)
is higher than their share of trade with the U.S.A. (17.3%), and the
latter is also lower than the one with the Euro-area (19.9%). Table 3
decomposes the results showed in table 2 for each country. It evidences
that all countries of Mercosur have a low share of their exports and
imports with Andean Community countries. Moreover, Paraguay and
Uruguay shares of trade with the U.S. are not highly relevant, while
these countries have a more intense trading activity with Argentina
and Brazil. Although Brazil has a low level of trade openness, the
share of trade of all Mercosur countries with it is very important, it
has to be noted that this result is also determined by the dimensional
differences among these economies. Hence, the situation of Brazil
seems to be determined by its dimension and gives to this country
a central role in the future evolution of trade relationships in Latin
America.
Table 2 evidences a different situation for the Andean Commu-
nity countries. On average these countries trade predominantly with
the U.S. (34%), while the share of intra-regional trade is low (14%),
moreover all the countries share is not far away from the total average.
Then, looking at national data, table 3 shows that Bolivia is more ori-
ented towards Brazil and Argentina and less towards the U.S.A. with
respect to other Andean Community countries. In fact Ecuador, Peru,
Venezuela and Colombia are closed to trade with Mercosur but have
an intense trading activity with the United States, giving great impor-
tance to a possible role for the U.S. dollar in an hypothetical monetary
union for these countries.
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Table 2: TRADE INTERDEPENDENCE, 2004 (1)
Trade Conducted with:
NAFTA
Subregion USA Total EU USA + Subr.
Mercosur (2) 29 17.3 19.4 19.9 44.5
Argentina 23 13.4 16.2 21.1 36.4
Brazil 8.7 24.2 28.6 25.1 32.9
Paraguay 49.8 14.8 15.4 10 64.6
Uruguay 34.4 9.6 15.5 17.8 44
Andean Community (2) 14 34 37.3 14.6 47.4
Bolivia 18.4 10.7 13 6.9 29.3
Colombia 15.8 37.6 43 16.8 53.4
Ecuador 16.9 31.6 35 17.3 48.5
Peru 8.5 25.9 28.9 18.7 34.4
Venezuela 10.2 61.3 66.8 13.3 71.5
NAFTA(2) 61.6 - - 12.5 -
Canada 77.1 75.1 - 10.6 -
Mexico 76.1 73.1 - 7.1 -
United States 31.5 - - 19.8 -
Memorandum Items :
Chile 18.3(4) 12.3 17.7 21.8 30.6
Euro-area countries (2)(3) 55.1 - - - -
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2004; IFS, 2006.
(1)[(Exports + Imports)/(TotalExports + TotalImports)] ∗ 100.
(2) Regional averages are simple averages.
(3) Averages of the trade shares euro-area countries showed in 1998. Including Greece.
(4) With Mercosur.
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Thus, even computing the intra-community trade plus the share of
trade with the U.S.A. (44.5% and 47.4%) no area is able to perform
better than EU countries in 1988 (55.1%).
It has to be noted that Mercosur has experienced a sharp decline
in the share of intra-trade from 2000, as showed in figure 1 in the ap-
pendix. The share of trade that Mercosur countries conduct with each
other has shown a clear upward trend since Mercosur was created, but
despite the fact that many observers expected this trend to continue,
starting from year 2000 there has been a decline in all the countries.
The evidence from the Andean Community does not show any clear
pattern at an aggregate level (figure 2), reflecting the bleak pattern of
countries like Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela.
Concluding, all the countries in Latin America after 10 years have
the same level of intra-trade with their continental neighbors, and
the general trend of trade integration for Latin America has remained
constant over the last ten years (see figure 3). Thus it seems clear
that, at a continental level, there is no evidence that supports any
monetary integration. Moreover, also a sub-regional analysis of trade
relationships based on the institutional sub-groups of Mercosur and
Andean Community, has given little support for an intra-regional uni-
fication. In sum it seems that at least two different areas can be
identified. Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay trading
relationships seem to be on a good level that has just to be increased
in future years. On the other side the same reasoning seems to have
no sense for Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and Colombia that have a high
trade-share with the U.S.A.. Hence, it seems to be more appropriated
(isolating the trade interdependence criterion) the idea of an anchoring
to the U.S. dollar for these countries.
4 Likelihood of Asymmetric Shocks
As stated in the literature on OCA, the presence of pronounced asym-
metric shocks between two economies makes the cost of doing away
with the exchange rate, as an instrument of adjustment, more relevant.
4.1 Methodology
This framework is estimated using a procedure proposed by Blanchard
and Quah (1989) that permits to decompose permanent and tempo-
rary shocks to a variable using a vector auto-regression (VAR). The
theoretical model is represented by a VAR in the primitive form:
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[
∆yt
∆pt
]
= B(L)
[
ε1t
ε2t
]
(1)
where, according with Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), ∆yt is the
real GDP growth rate, ∆pt is the price inflation, while ε1t and ε2t
are assumed to be demand and supply shocks. The matrix B(L)
represents the impulse-response functions of the shocks to real GDP
growth rate and price inflation, it is as follows:
B(L) =
[∑∞
k=0 b11(k)L
k
∑∞
k=0 b12(k)L
k∑∞
k=0 b21(k)L
k
∑∞
k=0 b22(k)L
k
]
(2)
where L is the lag operator and k is the number of lags. Note that at
lag k = 0, equation (1) can be written as follows:[
∆yt
∆pt
]
=
[
b11(0) b12(0)
b21(0) b22(0)
] [
ε1t
ε2t
]
(3)
or in a more compact form Xt = B(0)εt.
It has to be noted that equation (1) cannot be directly estimated
because ε1t and ε2t are not observable. In order to construct ε1t and
ε2t a VAR expressed in the following form has to be estimated:[
∆yt
∆pt
]
= A(L)
[
∆yt−1
∆pt−1
]
+
[
e1t
e2t
]
(4)
where A(L) is the VAR coefficients matrix at various p lags, while
e1t and e2t are the error terms that comprise a combination of the
primitive shocks ε1t and ε2t. The model expressed in (4) can be esti-
mated since current and lagged values of output and price are known.
Rearranging the VAR in equation (4) into its moving average form it
is possible to identify the underlying shocks:[
∆yt
∆pt
]
= [I −A(L)]−1
[
e1t
e2t
]
. (5)
Notice that at lag K = 0, [
∆yt
∆pt
]
=
[
e1t
e2t
]
(6)
which together with (3) gives:[
e1t
e2t
]
=
[
b11(0) b12(0)
b21(0) b22(0)
] [
ε1t
ε2t
]
. (7)
Equation (7) can be written more compactly,
et = B(0)εt (8)
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Substituting equation (8) into (5), the theoretical model is obtained.
Moreover, the shocks can now be retrieved from equation (7), in
order to do that the four elements of the matrix B(0) have to be
identified. To do this, four restrictions must be imposed. The first
three are direct consequences of the assumption that the variance-
covariance matrix of the shocks is an identity matrix, meaning that
the variances are normalized to unity while the covariance is zero.
The fourth restriction is based on the assumption that one shock has
temporary effects on output 5.
Post-multiplying (8) by e′t, gives ete′t = B(0)εtε′tB(0)′ that can
be rewritten as ete′t = B(0)B(0)′, since εtε′t is an identity matrix.
Moreover ete′t is the variance-covariance matrix of the standard form
(σ) that can be estimated from (4). Hence, in scalar form, the first
three restrictions are obtained from the following three equations:
σ11 = b211 + b
2
12. (9)
σ22 = b221 + b
2
22. (10)
σ12 = b11b21 + b12b22. (11)
The fourth restriction states that the top left-hand element of the
B(L)) matrix has to be zero. Since substituting (8) in (5) gives
Xt = (I − A(L))−1B(0)εt the fourth restriction can be written is
the following scalar form:[
I −
p∑
k=0
a22(k)
]
b11(0) +
p∑
k=0
a12(k)b21(0) = 0. (12)
Equations from (9) to (12) form a system of four equations in four
unknowns, given by the bs. Once they are obtained, B(0) can be
identified. Thus, shocks ε1t and ε2t can be identified rearranging (8)
in:
εt = B(0)−1et. (13)
Given that B(0) is identified through (9) to (12), while et are known
thanks to (4), equation (13) permits to identify both εt shocks.
One of the possible theoretical backgrounds that can justify this
approach, is a Neo-Kenesian AS-AD model. This model permits a
distinction between long-run and short-run macroeconomic equilib-
ria, and allows to identify demand and supply shocks from observable
5Usually the assumption is based on the no long-run impact of the demand shocks on
the level of output.
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dynamics of real output and price level thanks to two particular fea-
tures. A positive demand shock increases output and prices in the
short run as a consequence of the assumption that capacity utiliza-
tion can be varied in the short run to exploit the profit opportunities
allowed by changes in aggregate demand. Since the capacity utiliza-
tion is assumed to return to its normal level in the long run, after the
initial impact the output level starts falling back to its initial level
while prices continue to rise. Thus, demand shocks have no perma-
nent effect on output and only supply shocks may affect real output
in the long run. Moreover, positive demand shocks raise price level
while positive supply shocks reduce it in long and short run, Bayoumi
and Eichengreen (1994) use this as an over-identifying restriction and
suggest that it can be used to verify the results.
Blanchard and Quah (1989) have adopted the standard AS-AD
model to interpret their statistical model. In the case that the un-
derlying assumptions of the model are not respected by the results,
it has to be considered that the Blanchard and Quah’s decomposition
basically identifies a statistical model with permanent and temporary
disturbances. Thus, even in the latter case the decomposition can
be adopted, but alternative economic explanations and structural as-
sumptions must be used in order to interpret and justify the results.
4.2 Data
Annual data on real gross domestic product (GDP) were collected for
ten Countries in Latin America. All the data were taken from the
World Bank database. The choice of the source was due to the neces-
sity of assembling consistent data and spanning the longest possible
period of time. The data cover the period from 1962 to 2003 . More-
over, in order to estimate inflation, GDP deflator series were taken
from the same sources and they span the same period of time.
Before estimating supply and demand disturbances, data have
been analyzed in their unprocessed form. Table 4 reports mean and
standard deviation of growth and inflation 6. A value of 0.04 implies
a change of 4% in the variable.
The rough averages evidence low levels of growth for Argentina and
Bolivia and medium levels for all the other countries, but the most
interesting result concerns the high inflation levels experienced in this
area. Moreover, for some countries the variability is also very high
(Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia and Peru above the others), suggesting
that the adjustment costs (especially in terms of welfare) due to the
6Growth is measured by the first differences of the logarithms of real GDP, while
inflation is represented by the change in the logarithm of the GDP deflator
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high excursions in the price level have been very high. Evidence of this
phenomenon can be inferred from the consistent standard deviations
that characterize growth.
Table 4: Basic Statistics of Different Countries
Growth Inflation
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Latin America
Argentina 0.007 0.057 0.646 0.814
Brazil 0.043 0.042 0.769 0.895
Paraguay 0.041 0.037 0.122 0.086
Uruguay 0.014 0.045 0.378 0.225
Bolivia 0.002 0.037 0.346 0.850
Colombia 0.039 0.022 0.170 0.070
Ecuador 0.036 0.035 0.043 0.114
Peru 0.029 0.051 0.498 0.878
Venezuela 0.020 0.048 0.175 0.173
Chile 0.041 0.049 0.336 0.445
4.3 Estimation
Equation (4) was estimated for all the countries in the sample in order
to recover the disturbances. Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests on log-
GDP and log-GDP Deflator have evidenced the non-stationarity of
these series, since the null hypothesis of unit root can not be rejected
at any relevant significance level. Hence, the first differences of these
variables have been used in order to have stationary series. Thus, DG
represents the log-difference of GDP while DD is the log-difference
in GDP Deflator. As evidenced by Table 5, in this case the null
hypothesis of unit root is rejected for many series at a 5% significance
level7.
For a good specification of the VAR, the optimal lag length has
been identified through the combination of different criteria. Although
the available criteria were five, the Schwartz and Akaike Information
7All GDP growth series are I(0), while the first differences in the log of GDP deflator
are still I(1) for Brazil and Paraguay. For Paraguay the Consumption Price Index (CP )
has been used as a proxy for the inflation, while for Brazil no solution was found. Thus,
every result for Brazil has to take in account that its VAR contains an I(1) variable.
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Table 5: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test
DG DD
t-Statistic Prob. t-Statistic Prob.
Argentina -5.745392 0.0000 -3.424517 0.0157
Brazil -3.601439 0.0099 -2.009260 0.2819
Paraguay -3.390189 0.0169 -2.843119 0.0611
Uruguay -4.119894 0.0024 -3.426008 0.0155
Bolivia -4.845032 0.0003 -2.947379 0.0484
Colombia -4.149394 0.0022 -2.805567 0.0661
Ecuador -5.194084 0.0001 -3.780862 0.0061
Peru -4.334626 0.0013 -2.618037 0.0974
Venezuela -4.540819 0.0007 -3.362531 0.0182
Chile -4.682164 0.0005 -2.843119 0.0611
For Paraguay CPI is tested instead of GDP Deflator .
Criteria have been used as the main tools for the choice of the speci-
fication. Because the optimal lag length for all countries was between
three and one, the lag has been set to two for each model in order to
maintain symmetry across different countries. Moreover, each VAR
satisfies the stability condition given that all the inverse roots of the
AR characteristic polynomial lie in the unit circle.
For all the Latin American countries the estimation is not in ac-
cordance with the over-identifying restriction. The impulse response
analysis shows that for seven countries in Latin America the perma-
nent shocks are associated with an increase in prices8. Hence, the
results suggest that these countries have experienced permanent de-
mand shocks. There are a number of different theories that predict
a long run effect for the demand shocks and can be used to inter-
pret this result. By a practical point of view, it can be argued that
the increase in trade openness that these countries have experienced
has determined permanent demand shocks thanks to the permanent
shift in the potential demand for their products. Moreover, according
to Keating (2006), destabilizing extreme price volatility can be an-
other plausible explanation. Saraceno (2002) states that cumulative
processes from monetary policies may be strengthened by excessive
price and wage variability. High intra-trade openness levels between
8See Appendix.
16
countries in the same region may act as a partial stabilizer, but as evi-
denced in table 3 the degree of intra-trade openness of these countries
is low. The results for Ecuador and Bolivia require a different inter-
pretation. For these countries it seems correct to identify temporary
demand shocks, but the price response to supply shocks is perverse.
Ecuador and Bolivia are raw materials and primary goods exporters,
in these cases the supply disturbances can be closely linked to terms
of trade changes, causing the perverse price behavior. An increase in
the price of unrefined petroleum could increase output through the
favorable impact of terms of trade on real incomes, but also through
the incentive to produce more petroleum.
Moreover, the high level of trade openness characterizing these
countries, as evidenced in table 1, has amplified the impact of changes
in the terms of trade on the aggregate demand.
Table 6: Disturbances and Adjustment Across Different Countries
Short-Run Disturbances Long-Run Disturbances
Size Speed Size Speed
Latin America
Argentina 0.036 0.013 -0.045 0.877
Brazil 0.026 0.030 0.131 0.571
Paraguay 0.039 0.047 0.122 0.543
Uruguay 0.019 0.003 0.062 0.871
Bolivia -0.002 -0.001 -0.065 0.814
Colombia 0.011 0.012 0.074 0.527
Ecuador 0.018 0.011 0.116 0.615
Peru 0.022 0.014 -0.095 0.934
Venezuela 0.033 0.029 0.078 0.791
Chile 0.049 0.044 0.115 0.721
The structural factorization conveys results about the dimension,
the speed of adjustment of disturbances and their correlation among
different countries.
For the size of long-run disturbances the cumulated seventh year
impact on output has been calculated, while for the short-run the
third-year impact has been chosen 9. It has to be noted that the choice
9Because the Blanchard and Quah decomposition restricts the variance of the estimated
shocks to unity, the impacts can be retrieved from the impulse-response function and they
measure the effect on real GDP of the underling shock.
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of the indicators has been determined by the high level of persistence
of shocks. Table 6 suggests that the impact of short-run disturbances
in Latin America in smaller than the one in the long-run, and that
the dimension of the latter is extremely high. As a comparison, the
long-run shocks size in Latin America is relatively large with respect
to East Asia10. Moreover, it seems that in the short-run the size of
shocks is more similar across countries, while there is a higher level of
unevenness in the size of long-run disturbances also across countries
belonging to MERCOSUR and Andean Community. Table 6 also
shows that the size of shocks are on average higher in countries that
showed a high level of trade and intra-trade openness, such as Chile,
Paraguay, Ecuador and Venezuela. Since large sizes of shocks imply
higher impacts, the cost of forgoing instruments that are able to offset
them (such as a monetary policy) is very high for Latin American
countries.
Similarly to the size effect, a slow adjustment of an economy after
a shock increases the cost of loosing policy autonomy and fixing the
exchange rate. Hence, the speed of adjustment has been measured
thanks to the impulse-response estimation. The second and fourth
column in table 5 present the results of the impulse-response analy-
sis. A simple measure of the speed of adjustment for the long-run
disturbances is the ratio of the impulse-response function in the third
year to its seventh year value11. A high value indicates a fast speed of
adjustment, a low value suggests relative slow adjustment processes.
The measure of the speed of adjustment to short-run shocks is the
value of impulse-response function after five years, in this case a high
value represents a slow adjustment12.
The evidence from the long-run disturbances analysis shows that
all the shocks have a high level of persistence. Nevertheless, some
countries still show a high speed of propagation of the shock after five
years (Colombia, Paraguay and Brazil), while another group seems
to be in the stabilizing part of the response path (i.e. Peru and
Uruguay). Similar results characterize the speed of adjustment to tem-
porary shocks. Countries with a slow adjustment to permanent shocks
also show a strong persistence of temporary disturbances. Moreover
the relative persistence is still high in other countries such as Chile,
Venezuela and Paraguay.
Thus, independently of the shocks correlation, given the dimen-
10See Zhang et al. (2003).
11The choice of the seventh year as the base year instead of the fifth one has been due
to the persistence of the effects of shocks, as evidenced by the impulse-response analysis.
12A comparison with the two years response permits to figure out the speed of absorbtion
of the shock.
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sion of permanent shocks, and the long persistence of temporary dis-
turbances there is no evidence for a possible currency union in Latin
America. The observed asymmetries could be a strong obstacle for
any monetary integration in the region, because the size and the di-
rection of the adjustments for any country could be different even in
the case of a positive correlation of the shocks.
In order to evaluate the contribution of each shock to the two vari-
ables, a Variance Decomposition analysis is performed. Thanks to this
procedure it is possible to decompose the variation in the percentage
changes of the forecast error variance of inflation and growth that are
due to the structural shocks13. In output variability the permanent
shocks count for over 80% in Bolivia Ecuador, Colombia, Brazil, Ar-
gentina and Peru. The variability of growth explained by permanent
shocks is less evident for the rest of the countries. No shock seems to
be predominant for the variability of growth in Uruguay, Venezuela
and Paraguay, at least in the short run. The shocks influence on
inflation variability seems to be more homogeneous across countries.
Temporary shocks consistently affects (at least in the short run) prices
variability, even if their influence decreases over time. Nevertheless,
the decrease of speed is different across countries. Argentina, Brazil
and Ecuador seem to experience smoother reductions over time.
Moreover, the Blanchard and Quah decomposition gives the op-
portunity to evaluate the correlation of disturbances.
Table 7: Temporary Shocks Correlations
Arg Bol Bra Chi Col Ecu Par Per Uru Ven
Argentina 1
Bolivia -0.21 1
Brazil -0.47 0.06 1
Chile 0.02 -0.25 0.06 1
Colombia 0.20 0.11 0.30 -0,08 1
Ecuador 0.05 0,26 0.11 -0.08 0.12 1
Paraguay -0.04 0.17 -0.06 0.08 -0.15 0.19 1
Peru 0.53 -0.24 -0.58 0.11 -0.03 -0.05 0.12 1
Uruguay 0.13 -0.21 0.03 0.46 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.14 1
Venezuela -0.38 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.06 0.15 -0.22 -0.27 0.13 1
13Due to space limitations no tables for this analysis are reported, but graphical results
are attached in the appendix. For each country the time horizon is the same of the
Impulse-Response analysis.
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Table 8: Permanent Shocks Correlations
Arg Bol Bra Chi Col Ecu Par Per Uru Ven
Argentina 1
Bolivia 0.09 1
Brazil -0.11 0.11 1
Chile -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 1
Colombia -0.05 -0.07 0.33 0.19 1
Ecuador -0.15 -0.07 -0.15 0.21 0.07 1
Paraguay -0.34 -0.09 0.13 0.59 0.21 0.16 1
Peru 0.07 0.19 0.08 -0.19 -0.16 -0.08 -0.26 1
Uruguay -0.29 -0.11 0.04 0.11 0.16 0.18 0.22 -0.10 1
Venezuela -0.06 0.11 0.15 0.38 0.09 -0.09 0.34 -0.15 -0.05 1
Tables 7 and 8 report the results for temporary and permanent
shocks. The results show low degree or even negative co-movements
for both temporary and permanent shocks. It can be argued that
the presence of permanent demand shocks has determined the higher
number of negative correlations for the permanent shocks14.
According to Silva et al. (2004), the negative co-movements be-
tween Argentina and Brazil could be a consequence of their different
exchange rate arrangements. When both countries had fixed exchange
rates with the U.S. dollar, the difference between Argentina and Brazil
was that the former did not neutralize the impact of intra-regional
capital flows, causing asymmetric adjustments due to domestic pol-
icy shocks. When Brazil switched to a floating regime in 1999 the
asymmetries were exacerbated, given that also shocks had asymmet-
ric impacts on their economic development. Argentina was touched
twice by every shocks, first by the original shock and thereafter by
the Brazilian currency devaluation. Silva et al. (2004) show that the
coexistence of Argentina’s fixed exchange regime and Brazil’s more in-
dependent policies caused divergent movements in the MERCOSUR
area.
Hence, the results from the structural decomposition imply rele-
vant differences in the speed of adjustment, a very low (or negative)
degree of co-movements among shocks and different sizes of distur-
bances. The logical conclusion in an OCA theory framework is that
14Demand shocks are affected by changes in the demand-management policies, and are
more likely to vary with the different international monetary adjustment that can differs
across countries.
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every possible process of monetary integration could suffer from impor-
tant obstacles. Thus, more policy coordination seems to be required
prior to attempt any economic integration.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper evaluated to what extent the actual level of economic in-
tegration in Latin America fits some classical OCA criteria in order
to establish a currency union.
A two-variables VAR model was used to identify permanent and
temporary shocks, using more than forty yearly observations from
Latin America. Overall trade openness and regional trade integra-
tion analysis were added in order to enrich the OCA analysis and to
interpret and explain some results.
Trade openness analysis evidenced a general increase in the degree
of openness in Latin America. The evidence from trade integration be-
tween Latin American countries did not show any significant progress.
Thus, it can be argued that these countries have not reoriented their
trade even after the introduction of MERCOSUR or Andean Commu-
nity, but they have only accompanied their trade openness pattern.
Nevertheless, at a sub-regional level two groups can be identified with
Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and Ecuador trading more with the U.S.A.,
while the rest of the region is more integrated, even if the degree of
integration has to be increased in order to satisfy this OCA criterion.
Structural shocks in Latin America were identified thanks to a
structural VAR analysis. A Blanchard and Quah decomposition was
used to distinguish between temporary and permanent shocks. Raw
data evidenced low levels of growth (especially for Argentina and Bo-
livia) and a high degree of variability of inflation.
A first important evidence from the impulse-response analysis was
that Latin America countries have experienced permanent demand
shocks. Nevertheless, there are some differences between single coun-
tries. Bolivia and Ecuador results showed perverse movements in
prices, determined by their exports structure and overall trade open-
ness degree.
High degrees of unevenness were evidenced in the size of perma-
nent shocks across countries. Moreover, the dimension of impact was
higher in the most open economies (Paraguay, Ecuador, Chile and
Venezuela).
The analysis of the speed of adjustment evidenced more homoge-
nous reactions, but the persistence of shocks is extremely high sug-
gesting that the costs of fixing the exchange rate could be too high for
Latin American countries.
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Variance decomposition confirmed all the previous results. It ev-
idenced a high percentage of output variability determined by per-
manent shocks. Moreover, the decrease in the influence of tempo-
rary shocks on short-run inflation variability has evidenced significant
differences across countries with Argentina and Brazil experiencing
smoother reductions over time.
Then, the structural shocks correlation between countries strength-
ened the impression that Latin America is a very heterogenous region
with low levels of economic synchronization and integration. Cor-
relation levels are low or negative, suggesting that the likelihood of
asymmetric shocks for Latin American countries is high.
Thus, based on these OCA criteria, it can be argued that any pro-
cess of integration (especially monetary) among different Latin Ameri-
can countries could face many obstacles. It seems that a higher degree
of policy coordination and economic integration is needed prior to any
attempt of further economic integrations.
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Figure 1: Mercosur Intra-Community Trade (Percentages)
Figure 2: Andean Community Intra-Community Trade (Percentages)
Figure 3: Trade Between Latin American Countries
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Figure 4: Impulse-Response Uruguay
Figure 5: Impulse-Response Chile
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Figure 6: Impulse-Response Venezuela
Figure 7: Impulse-Response Brazil
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Figure 8: Impulse-Response Bolivia
Figure 9: Impulse-Response Ecuador
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Figure 10: Impulse-Response Paraguay
Figure 11: Impulse-Response Colombia
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Figure 12: Impulse-Response Argentina
Figure 13: Impulse-Response Peru
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Figure 14: Uruguay
Figure 15: Chile
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Figure 16: Venezuela
Figure 17: Brazil
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Figure 18: Bolivia
Figure 19: Ecuador
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Figure 20: Paraguay
Figure 21: Colombia
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Figure 22: Argentina
Figure 23: Peru
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